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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM K. HOWARD, RUTH N.
HOWARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD,
and SHIRLEY L. HOWARD,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
-vs.1\fiLDRED M. HOWARD,
Defendant and Appellant.
MILDRED M. HOWARD,
Defendant and Third-Party
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No.
9552

-vs.WALKER BANK & TRUST COMpANY, as Administrator of the estate
of L. "\V. HOWARD, deceased, WILLIAM l(. HOWARD, RUTH N.
HOWARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD
and SHIRLEY L. HOWARD,
Third-Party Defendants,
and Respondents.
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Respondents agree with appellant's statement of
fact in which appellant states the single question is
whether that deed dated :3lay 9th, 1945 which the trial
court held to be defective, contained such description
that the land might be identified which was intended to
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be conveyed and therefore did convey the property, and
whether the trial court errored in denying appellant's
motion to assign the case for trial and to permit appellant to amend her cross-complaint. Respondents however, inject into their brief and argue matters not considered by the lower court and which could not have
been considered by the lower court without the taking of
testimony; namely as respondents contend, (1) lack of
delivery of the de-ed, and (2) the inequities which would
be brought about ·were the deed to be reformed. We
contend the argument of these points at this time is
most unfair to appellant and improper. This is repetitious of the tactics used by respondents in the lower
court and which we think influenced the decision in this
case.
The judgment entered and from which this appeal is
taken, recites that the deed is void for uncertainty. There
is no mention therein of lack of delivery or of the question of equities. Therefore we shall dwell but little in
answer to this part of respondents' brief.
Had appellant been afforded the opportunity to
produce evidence in the case the evidence would show
that respondents had, during the lifetime of their father,
received monies and properties to such extent that the
equities would weigh more favorably to appellant than
to respondents. Respondents 'vill probably take the
position that their arguing the question of lack of delivery
and equities is to ~ho'v lack of intent on the part of the
grantor, but respondents have gone far beyond such
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showing and they have included in their argument, stateInents "·hich are not before the court in the pleadings or
othenvise as to the amount and value of property covered
by the deed, and values of other properties which they
state "·pr0 received by appellant from her husband.
Respondents "rould have the court believe appellant was
a wife 'vho 1narried the deceased grantor late in life for
one purpose only, to acquire the property and estate of
the deceased as against the children of deceased by a
fonner marriage, but the pleadings do not support such
contention. On the contrary, it is sho"\\t"'Il by the pleadings
that appellant bore children by deceased, that one son
of decedent and appellant was at the time of the death
of the decedent, seventeen years of age. 'Therefore, it is
evident from the record of the case that decedent and
appellant were living together as husband and wife for
in excess of seventeen years, and they were living together as husband and wife at the time of the death of
decedent. It is clearly evident from such record that the
grantor did not intend to make a defective deed as
respondents contend. Where do respondents find one
\Vord in this record indicating even remotely that appellant made life so miserable for decedent that in order
to have a little peace at home decedent led his \vife to
believe he was deeding property to her when in fact he
\Vas intentionally making a defective deed?
As to respondents argument under their point 2 that
the deed \vas not intended as a present conveyance of a
present interest because appellant stated she was inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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structed to place the deed of record upon the death of
the grantor. If the question were properly before the
court, which we contend it is not and could not be without the taking of evidence, this court has held in the
Losee case 120 U. 385, 235 P. 2d 132, cited in appellant's
original brief, and in many other cases, that the delivery
of the deed is the detenninative act and not the recording of same. This court held in the Lose·e case, where
the grantor made deeds to children and delivered them
to one of her daughters with instructions to deliver
them to grantees after grantor's death, grantor even
having access to the deeds, and the daughter to whom
the deeds were delivered testifying she would have given
the deeds back had the grantor changed her mind, constituted a valid delivery passing title. Here appellant
alleged in her cross complaint that decedent made, executed and delivered to her the deed describing the property herein, and the lower court was obliged for the
purpose of the motion for judgment on the pleadings
to assume those allegations as true.
Respondents cite and rely on the case of Stanley vs.
Stanley, 94 P. 2d 465, 97 U. 250. It is interesting to
note in the Stanley case the court refers to the case of
Mower vs. Mower, 64 U. 260, 228 P. 911 and at page
467 quotes as follows:
''Since delivery is essentially a matter of
intent, which intent is to be arrived at from all
the facts and surrounding circumstances, we believe the better rule is to include in those facts
and eircun1stances declarations of the grantor
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both before and after the date of the deed, at
least where it appears that the dec]arations are
made fairly and in the ordinary course of life."
'11 he court will we think, follow the better rule as
announced in the JJf ower case and determine the case
from the facts and surrounding circumstances put into
evidence, not from bald statements which are not evidence.

As to error on the part of the lower court in not
affording appellant the opportunity to produce evidence
in the case we again refer to the Stanley case, page 467
wherein the court said:
"With respect to the delivery of the deed,
the trial court excluded evidence offered by the
defendant as to the formal act of delivery as being
incompetent under the provisions of Sec. 104-49-2,
R.S.U. 1933. However, she was permitted to testify that she first saw the deed on May 19, 1906,
in the testator's hands and next saw it in her own
hands after which she immediately placed it in
a tin box; that when she first saw the deed the
testator was removing it from his pocket, remarking that he had a present for her, and handed
it to her, and that she paid him a dollar, requesting however, that the deed be not recorded until
after his death, and that thereafter it remained
in her possession."
"This testimony would undoubtedly justify
an inference that the deed was delivered and
should be considered prima facie sufficient for
that purpose."
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While the law above quoted from the Stanley case
is applicable to the· ins~~nt case we find the reason the
court found the deed· had not been delivered with intent
to presently pass title 'vas that the evidence showed the
grantee filed a will upon the death of the grantor of. the
deed, which will named the grantee as beneficiary. In
the petition for probate of the will the grantee who was
the petitioner alleged in a verified petition that the testator owned the property in question at the time of his
death. A second and later will was found giving the
property described in the deed to an adopted son who
filed a petition for probate of the later will. Thereupon
the grantee filed· ·the deed of record and claimed _title
by virtue of the deed. The facts as pleaded in the instant
case are not even remotely like those of the Stanley case.
Under point 3 respondents cite Page on Wills. We
have no argument with the law as stated as it pertains
to wills but such is not the law as to reformation of deeds.
Page does state that it has been said, a court of equity
has no jurisdiction to reform a will but says it has been
said that refonnation would be granted if the will had
been executed in accordance with a contract to make a
will.
For the reasons heretofore stated, point 4 has no
place in the argument. Neither has point 5 regarding
equities. There is nothing in the record supporting the
argmnent of respondents as to equities. \Vho knows
what the evidence will show~ \Vho knows but 'vhat
appellant might have contributed much toward the preservation of the property, in the payment of taxes and
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upkeep, etc. Neither is there any evidence a.s to values
of properties before the court.
In the Carson vs. Palmer (Fla. 1939), 190 So. 720
case relied upon by respondents it appears the deed
involved contained two inconsistent descriptions, either
of \Vhich would identify a different parcel of property
from that described by the other. ·The facts are not at
all like. the instant case.
Respondents argue that Mr. Bush, a civil engineer,
if called by appellant would have no authority to say
which should be deleted or what should be added to
make a valid description.· Appellant does not contend
Mr. Bush 'vould have such authority. From the affidavit
contained in the record, Mr. Bush would testify that
he could locate the property by the description contained
therein by applying the rules of survey. This is all that
is necessary to be shown according to the authorities
cited by appellant in her original brief.
Respondents state the west call, N. 46° 25' W. runs
through the middle of the tract included in the deed.
This is not so, that line is located toward the westerly
line and cuts off the small tract protruding, shown at
the lower left hand corner of the plat attached to appellant's original brief.
As to the original deed by which Mr. Hovlard acquired title to the tract and appellant's referring to
same, appellant has a right to refer to that deed, it helps
to show the intent of the grantor in the deed here in
question in following the identical calls with those contained in the deed by which Howard took title to the
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tract. The rule of law is that the whole of the document
(the deed here in question) is to be taken together so
as to give effect to every part, each clause helping to
interpret the others.
The law announced in 68 ALR page 12 relied upon
by respondents referring to patent defects is not in
point. It is evident from those authorities that which is
considered as patent defects is for example where the
description states, ''home lot" in a given lot, block and
"\\.,.ard, or "27 acres in fractional 15, in Vandenburgh
County, Indiana." The law given in such cases is to the
effect that there must be such an uncertainty appearing
on the face of the deed that the court, reading the language in the light of all the facts and circumstances
referred to in the instru.ment, is unable to derive therefrom the intention of the grantor as to what land was
to be conveyed. We contend that from the facts and circumstances and from a reading of the description given
in the Howard deed, the intention of the grantor is clearly
shown. (Italics added).
Respondents argue the Losee. case does not help
appellant because there was in that case a positive delivery of the deed. So too was the Howard deed delivered.
How can respondents contend there was no delivery in
this case~ The court in granting this judgment must
assume there was a positive and unconditional delivery
of the deed.
At page 25, respondents say, "It is obvious that
where there is on the face of the deed, such information
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that the missing courses and distances fairly suggest
themselves the deed may be upheld." This is appellant's
contention, such admission on the part of respondent
is decisive of the case.
Under point 9 respondents argue the reference to
acreage is of no assistance to appellant because the acre~
age in the tract is in excess of 2. 75 acres, as stated by
the grantor in the deed, 2.75 acres more or less. The
reference to acreage is important. It shows the grantor
by his deed was not intending to convey .a small parcel
out of a large tract but he 'vas conveying a large tract
out of which he: excepted small tracts theretofore conveyed by him. It is evident the grantor intended to convey all that was left out of the original tract.
Respondents ask, "What did the grantor intend to
retain~" The answer is he did not intend to retain any
part of the tract which was left after having conveyed
the Temple and Wood and theatre tracts and omitting
the small piece at the lower left hand corner which protrudes westerly from the large tract.
The conclusion set out in respondents' brief states
among other things, from the admissions of appellant,
if the defective deed is reformed, almost the whole of
decedent's estate \viii go to the widow and the children
of the first marriage will be virtually disinherited. \Ve
submit there is nothing in the pleadings or admissions
as a basis for such statement. Neither is there anything
in the record of this case which shows injustice or
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inequity if the deed is reformed, this question could only
he before the court, if evidence 'vere taken.

CONCLUSION
The deed is so evident of the intention of the grantor
the same should be reformed and judgment should be
so entered.
Respectfully submitted,

M. v. BACKMAN OF
BACKl\fAN, BACKMAN & CLARK,
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant.
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